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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: RANK AND FILE UNION
AS REPRESENTATIVE OF SUPERVISORS
By WiLLuA C. MILLER
Is a strike by a rank and file union to force an employer to recognize
it as the representative of supervisory employees unlawful in California?
The Supreme Court of California has recently had a chance to pass on this
question in Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks International Ass'n.1 In
addition, recent changes in federal legislation have brought the question of
bargaining by supervisors into focus.
A distinction should be made between the case where supervisors them-
selves strike through a union of their own and the situation where a rank and
file union strikes for the inclusion of supervisors., Attention m this comment
will be concentrated on the rank and file strike. Reference will be made to
the other only when necessary.
Before discussing the question of what factors are determinative of
whether such is a legitimate interest of a rank and file unon in California, it
must be seen if this kind of controversy is controlled by federal legislation.
Supervisory Personnel and the National Labor Relations Act. '
Prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act,2 the status of supervisors
under the National Labor Relations Act3 was a very controversial subject.
The controversy was whether or not the right to bargain collectively with their
employer came within the act's protection.' By 1946 a trend was established
to include within the act bargaining by supervisors through an zndependent
union.
In 1947, the United States Supreme Court decided Packard Motor Car
Co. v. National Labor Relatzons Board.5 This case ended the controversy as
far as the unamended N.L.R.A. was concerned. The court upheld an N.L.R.B.
ruling that foremen, represented by an independent union, could bargain
collectively with their employer. The Supreme Court did not pass upon the
question of whether the N.L.R.A. extended to supervisors bargaining through
a rank and file union.
The Labor Board thought the N.L.R.A. also covered the rank and file
situation. In re Jones & L. Steel Corp.' the Board ruled that foremen could
141 A.C. 579, 261 P.2d 721 (1953).
261 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 151-166 (1947) (Labor Management Relations Act).
849 STAT. 457 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 151-166 (1947).
'American Steel Foundries v. National Labor Relations Bd., 158 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1946);
National Labor Relations Board v. Armour & Co., 154 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1946), 169 A.L.R. 421
(1947) ; Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 146 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.
1945), cert. denied 325 U.S. 886 (1945) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Skinner & K. Stationery
Co., 113 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1940).
5330 U.S. 485 (1947)666 N.L.R.B. (F.) 386 (1946). See Note, 173 A.L.R. 1401, 1408 (1948).
1954] COMMENTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
affiliate with a rank and file union which might then bargain collectively with
the employer. With this ruling the Board did an about face from its attitude
in an earlier case, involving the same company, in which the following
statement appears:
"The Board on these grounds has announced the general policy of not
including supervisory employees of any grade in bargaining units which
include the employees under them; but in proper cases it gives the supervisors
a separate unit of their own."' 7 (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court did not pass on either of these rulings.
Effect of the Taft-Hartley Act on Bargaining by Supervisors; the
Relinquishment of Federal Jurisdiction.
The Taft-Hartley Act, Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
amended the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 to exclude from the defi-
nition of "employee" "any individual employed as a supervisor." Section 2
(11) of the amending act states that the term "supervisor" means a person
having the authority to
"4 hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine
or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment."
The effect of the amendment was to withhold from supervisors the pro-
tection of federal legislation whether they seek collective bargaining through
an independent or a rank and file union.' It left the regulation of collective
bargaining by supervisors a matter of state law.9 In the Safeway case it was
stated:
since the state court can act, it has the jurisdiction to deter-
mine the facts upon which its jurisdiction depends."' 0
Thus, if the state court finds that the matter before it concerns the bar-
gaining rights of supervisors, then it has jurisdiction to apply state law to
the regulation of their rights.
The precise effect of the amendment is illustrated by a federal case that
involved a rank and file union. In Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates v. Nation-
'Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 146 F.2d 833, 834 (5th Cir.
1945)
8National Labor Relations Board v. Leland-Gifford Co., 200 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1952), National
Labor Relations Board v. Quincy Steel Casting Co., Inc., 200 F.2d 293 (1st Cir. 1952), National
Labor Relations Board v. Chautauqua Hardware Corp., 192 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1951), Ohio Power
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 176 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1949), 11 A.L.R.2d 243 (1950), Morrison v. Shopmens'
Local Union 682, Etc., 114 F.Supp. 54 (W.D. Ky. 1953)
'Supra note 1.
"0 Supra note 1 at 585, 261 P.2d at 724.
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al Labor Relations Board11 a determination that a foreman might be a mem-
ber of a union controlled by or identical with the union representing the rank
and ifie employees under the foreman's supervision was modified on rehear-
ing to limit the enforcement of the decree to the period ending with the effec-
tive date of the Taft-Hartley Act.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the problem is within the influence of
federal legislation only in so far as changes in the national outlook have
already or may in the future affect the local viewpoint as to what is sound
public policy.
Injunction Against Unlawful Strikes: The Proper Purpose Doctrine.
It has been said that all states now take the view that injunction will
issue against labor activities which have as their end an improper purpose.12
Prior to 1940 there seems to have been a difference of opinion as to whether
this doctrine was applicable in California."3 However, decisions since then
make it clear that strikes for objects contrary to state policy will be en-
joined.'" This was the action of the California Supreme Court in the Safeway
case.
Apparently, the Safeway case is the only California decision directly in
point. In that case the court did not cite any California case which it cofsid-
ered controlling of the question except in so far as it referred the reader to
decisions holding that strikes for improper purposes will be enjoined. For
this reason it is desirable to examine this case.
The case arose when the company brought an action to enjoin strike
activities of the rank and file clerks' union. The trial court found the strike
was the result of the refusal of Safeway to include its managers in the labor
contract with the union. The Superior Court of Alameda County found that
the purpose of the strike was improper and issued a preliminary injunction.
The District Court of Appeals' 5 modified the injunction to limit its enforce.
ment to controlling the methods the union was using in attaining its object.
But this decided, in effect, that the purpose was a proper one. The Supreme
Court, two justices dissenting, held that the purpose of the strike was to fur-
ther an objective contrary to the public policy of the state, and enjoined the
union. Upon what basis is this result reached?
11162 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1947).
"2Armstrong, Fhere Are We Going With Picketing, 36 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 34 (1948).
13Ibd.
24Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 CaL2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948), affd. 339 U.S. 460 (1949);
James v. Marmship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Magill Bros. v. Building Service
Etc. Union, 20 Cal.2d 506, 127 P.2d 542 (1942) ; McKay v. Retail Auto S. L. Umon No. 1067, 16
Cal.2d 311, 106 P.2d 373 (1940).
'- CalApp.2d -, 234 P.2d 678 (1951).
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The Division of the Supervisor's Loyalty by Membership in a Rank
and File Union.
The Safeway decision closes with the following statement:
"Confronted with the responsibility of declaration where as here there
is no constitutional or legislative guide on the subject we hold that the trial
court was correct in deciding that the coercion sought to be exercised by
the defendants under the circumstances of the case was not reasonably related
to any legitimate interest of organized labor; and that as a matter of
sound public policy were enjomable within the equity jurisdiction of the
court."' 6
Obviously this is not a decision that such a strike is directly contrary to
state legislation or is unconstitutional. It is a judicial declaration of public
policy. Earlier in the opinion the court remarks'" that public policy is pri-
marily for the Legislature to determine, but that when neither the constitu-
tion nor the Legislature has spoken on the subject the courts may make the
declaration. Since the court was unfettered by local precedents it would seem
that it was free to choose which way it should go in the interests of public
policy. The question remaining is: why did the court feel that the object was
contrary to sound public policy?
The following passage from the opinion answers this question.
"Since on this record store managers are agents of management when so
acting they owe undivided loyalty to their principal. As members of the de-
fendant unions they would under union rules be in duty bound to advance the
cause for the community interest of store managers and clerks in any dispute
or disagreement with their principal. They would be under constant appre-
hension of penalties under union rules, such as fines, suspension, or expul-
sion. It is eminently proper that management supervisors, the store managers
in this case, be kept free from the divided loyalty that would be engendered
by compulsory membership in the defendant local unions."' 8 (Emphasis
added.)
The division of the loyalty of the supervisory personnel has been the
chief objection to their organization in a rank and file union in all cases where
the question has been considered. The objection has been that this type of
organization results in a two way pull on supervisors between the interests
of those who have hired them to supervise and the interests of those who are
to be supervised. Since the argument against division of loyalty plays such
a large part in these cases, it is important to keep in mind that this situa-
tion is to be distinguished from one in which managers are organized in a
union of their own, in which their allegiance is split between their employers
and themselves. The sanction for emphasizing the division of loyalty can be
'6 Supra note 1, at 587-588, 261 P.2d at 726.
I71d. at 586, 261 P.2d at 725, See, e.g., Tanenhaus, Picketing-Free Speech: The Growth of The
New Law of Picketing From 1940 to 1952, 38 Cornell L. Q. 1, 29 (1952)
"Supra note 1, at 587, 261 P.2d at 726.
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found by considering the shift in national policy which led to the exclusion
of supervisors from the N.L.R.A.
An Epilogue to Re Jones & L. Steel Corporation.
The N.L.R.B. case re Jones & L. Steel Corp. has been mentioned above.
It should be remembered that the Board there ruled that the N.L.R.A. covered
bargaining by foremen through a rank and file union. A report of the Senate
Labor Committee submitted subsequent to this ruling is of a different tenor.
Keeping in mind that this report preceded the amendment of.the N.L.R.A.,
it indicates the motives of Congress in establishing federal policy in this
matter. After discussing the extension of the N.L.R.A. to cover supervisors
in organizations "of the very men they were hired to supervise," the follow-
ing appears in the report:
"The folly of permitting a continuation of this policy is dramatically
illustrated by what has happened in the captive mines of the Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. since supervisory employees were organized by the United Mine
Workers under the protection of this act. Disciplinary slips in these mines
have fallen off by two-thirds and the accident rate in each mine has doubled.
... It is natural to expect that unless this congress takes action, manage-
ment will be deprived of the undivided loyalty of its foremen. There is an in-
herent tendency to subordinate their interests wherever they conflict with
those of the rank and file."'
u
The Safeway opinion and this report show a conviction that "supervisor-
rank and file" bargaining is to be distinguished from the case where super-
visors are organized in a union of their own. Both emphasize that in the
former the supervisor must further the interests of rank and file employees.
However, Congress went a step further than the Safeway case does. The
Safeway case condemns only the rank and file situation. Congress removed
federal protection of collective bargaining by supervisors entirely. As far as
contemporary national policy is concerned, it is apparently not considered
sound for supervisors to require their employer to bargain collectively with
them even if they are in an independent union. 0 But it remains to be seen
whether there is any California legislation which should require an opposite
conclusion in a case like this. If not, whether any other reasons counteract
the force of the argument against division of loyalty.
California Public Policy as Expressed in the Labor Code.
The dissenting opinion in the Safeway case2' calls attention to section
923 of the California Labor Code. This statute provides:
The public policy of this state is declared as follows:
In dealing with such employers the individual unorganized
"'See 173 A.L.R. 1401, 1408 (1948).
"See note 8 supra.
"Supra note 1, at 588, 261 P.2d at 727.
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worker is helpless. . Therefore it is necessary that the individual work-
man have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of
his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
The dissent then argued that because there is no qualification on the
word "employee" in this section it was intended to include supervisory as
well as non-supervisory employees, and cited a California case22 holding that
a mine superintendent is an employee within the meaning of the labor laws.
The question is not whether this section was meant to insure supervisors
the right to bargain collectively. The question is whether it also meant to in-
sure rank and file unions full freedom in the selection of members, not only
from their own employee-level but also from groups composed of persons
who are in an agency relationship with management. In every case there
will be close questions of fact as to who wants whom. Do the supervisors se-
lect the rank and file union or does the rank and fie union select the super-
visors? In the Safeway case, according to the District Court of Appeal,2" less
than half of the managers of the stores struck sought organization by the de-
fendant union. Therefore, even those who would apply section 923 in favor
of supervisors who actively seek affiliation with a rank and file union might
think it not applicable to the Safeway facts. The rank and file union was not,
with respect to more than half the managers, to quote from the statute, "'a
representative of (their) own choosing." To enforce the union demands in a
case similar to Safeway controversy would result not only in the division of
loyalty already mentioned but also a further split within the ranks of the
supervisors themselves.
Assuming that supervisors are unopposed to absorption by a rank and
file union, the question of whether the statute was intended to insure them
that right becomes one of interpretation. The cases in which this statute has
been applied are of little aid as precedents. Apparently the statute has never
been applied to define state policy in this fact situation. However, a refer-
ence to section 923 in a 1940 California case24 raises the question of the
desirability of applying it to sanction a strike for this purpose. The court in
that case said, in substance, that the intended effect of the statute (together
with section 921 of the same code) was to "balance the industrial equation"
by placing employer and employee on an equal footing. In view of the
arguments advanced in the Safeway opinion and the policy behind the exclu-
"Davis v. Moms, 37 Cal.App.2d 269, 99 P.2d 345 (1940)
2'Supra note 15, 234 P.2d at 680.
"Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, 16 Cal.2d 379, 106 P.2d 403 (1940)
[VoL 5
sion of supervisors from the N.L.R.A., it could be maintained that including
supervisors in a rank and file union upsets the "balance of the industrial
equation" in the other direction. Namely, that it puts agents of management
in the hands of those whose interests are "adverse" to the interests of the
employer and thus tips the scale in favor of labor.
In the last analysis a categorical exclusion of the facts in controversy
from the protection of this statute is impossible. It may or may not have
been intended by the legislature to cover this case. From the layman's point
of view, at least, the question of whether it ought to require management to
bargain collectively with a union of rank and file clerks and supervisors will
be dependent largely on personal notions of what is fair in such cases.
Validity of the Argument Against Division of Loyalty as Applied to
the Supervisor-Rank and File Situation.
During the period when the federal courts and the N.L.R.B. were de-
termining the status of supervisors under the N.L.R.A., a common objection
of counsel for the employer was that supervisors organized in any union re-
sulted in an unsatisfactory division of loyalty. To this objection there were
two answers. First, the N.L.R.A. as it then stood did not exclude supervisors.
Second, there is always some division of loyalty between employer and em-
ployee. Therefore as between the two parties, supervisors and employer, the
argument does not have as much force as when a third party, a rank and
file union, is introduced.
These answers to the argument against division of loyalty where super-
visors sought bargaining through a union of their own are illustrated by the
Packard case. The court there said:
"It is also urged upon us . .. that it puts union foremen in the position
of serving two masters, divides their loyalty and makes generally for bad rela-
tions between management and labor. However we might appraise the force
of these arguments as a policy matter, we are not authorized to base deci-
sions of a question of law upon them. They concern the wisdom of legislation;
they cannot alter the meaning of otherwise plain provisions."'25 (Emphasis
added.)
Though the decision is an interpretation of the N.L.R.A., apart from the
act the court was unimpressed by the argument against division of loyalty
as applied to supervisors actively seeking bargaining through an independent
union. To wit:
" . . . Though the foreman is the faithful representative of the em-
ployer in maintaining a production schedule, his interest properly may be
adverse to that of the employer when it comes to fixing his own wages, hours,
"Supra note 5, at 493.
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seniority rights or working conditions. He does not lose his right to serve
hImself in these respects because he serves his master in others.
It (the company) fears that if foremen combine to bargain
advantages for themselves, they will sometimes be governed by interests of
their own or of their fellow foremen, rather than by the company's inter-
est.12 6 (Emphasis added.)
Assuming that the argument against division of loyalty is not all-con-
vincing when applied to an independent union of supervisors, it may still
be sound when applied to a rank and file union which includes supervisors.
To say that a supervisor should not lose his right to serve himself does not
answer the question of whether he should be bound to serve as well rank and
file employees. These employees he is already obligated to supervise in the
interests of his employer. In this last situation, the degree of division of
loyalty engendered is greatly in excess of the ordinary conflict of interests
in any master-servant relationship. The validity of the argument against
division of loyalty is thus directly proportionate to the division of loyalty
engendered.
The Ultimate Question.
The decision in the Safeway case is founded on the reasoning that
the divided loyalty which results when rank and file unions are the bargain-
ing agents of supervisors is contrary to public policy. It may be conceded
that a supervisor's interest may be properly adverse with respect to his own
rights. Nevertheless the employer is entitled to know that with respect to
rank and file disciplinary problems the supervisor's interest will not be ad-
verse to that of the employer. However, the ultimate question is whether
rank and file bargaining for supervisors is a legitimate interest of organized
labor in spite of the division of loyalty. In this respect it should be noted
that a decision which enjoins a strike for this purpose does not deny the
supervisor the right to bargain collectively but only through a rank and file
union. He is not, as section 923 puts it, "helpless . . . to protect his free-
dom of labor, and therefore to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of his
employment." If the Safeway decision entirely foreclosed the right of super-
visors to bargain collectively, then the problem would require an entirely
different analysis.
In the last analysis, it would appear that a supervisor may still bargain
through an independent union in California. In this sense he is still pro-
tected. Whether any reasons exist more important than division of loyalty
which should justify the rank and file union's demands, is a matter for indi-
vidual decision according to personal ideas of what is a proper balance be-
tween management and labor.
2"Id. at 489.
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